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Abstract:  
This paper examines how rotation arrangement between two groups of Japanese 
fishers with different institutional arrangements affects fishing behaviour and 
economic outcomes in a particular economic environment characterised by price 
discrimination and product durability. In one group, fishers cooperate and maximise 
the extraction of rents, while fishers in the second group behave non-cooperatively. 
Except for a few months in which only the first group operates, the two groups fish on 
alternating days. We apply a model of alternating duopoly and examine the effects of 
the rotating arrangement on fishers' behaviour in the two groups. Our model shows 
that the cooperating group behaves like a price discriminating monopolist and tends to 
uphold prices. When the two groups rotate fishing days, interesting strategic 
interdependence arises: the cooperating group tends to produce more, which prevents 
the non-cooperating group from unprofitable demand pre-emption. The empirical 
analysis of original data confirms this result. 
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Eﬀects of rotation scheme on fishing behaviour
with price discrimination and limited durability:
Theory and evidence∗
Erika Seki†
Abstract
This paper examines how rotation arrangement between two groups
of fishers with diﬀerent institutional arrangements aﬀects fishing behaviour
and economic outcomes in a particular economic environment characterised
by price discrimination and product durability. In one group, fishers coop-
erate and maximise the extraction of rents, while members in the second
group behave non-cooperatively. Applying a model of alternating duopoly,
we show that the cooperating group behaves like a price discriminating
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monopolist and tends to uphold prices. When the two groups rotate fish-
ing days the cooperating group tends to produce more, which prevents the
non-cooperating group from unprofitable demand pre-emption.
Key words: price discrimination, durable goods, alternating duopoly,
rotation, fisheries; JEL classification: D23; Q22
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1. Introduction
Local-level cooperative institutions play a substantial role in regulating and re-
solving conflicts over the usage of local natural resources (Baland and Platteau
1996). These local informal institutions are of particular interest because a signif-
icant part of the livelihood of the poor in developing countries depends on local
natural resources such as forestry, irrigation, grazing, and fisheries. There is also
a growing recognition that local-level community organisations have the potential
to manage natural resources and alleviate poverty more eﬀectively than state and
private control (Bowles and Gintis 2002; Bardhan 1993; Ostrom 1990).
Rotation is one of the institutional arrangements commonly applied to allo-
cate irrigation water, firewood and other forests products, and access to fishing
spots1. While it is fairly obvious that these rotation arrangements promote eq-
uity and resolve conflicts among the people concerned, its eﬀects on economic
outcomes, particularly how it aﬀects individual usage of resources and overall ef-
ficiency, are ambiguous. Most empirical studies on rotational arrangements in
fishing communities seem to endorse the general view that the eﬀectiveness of ro-
tation arrangements is limited: it avoids conflicts and ensures equitable allocation
of resources among the users but it does not address fundamental issue of inter-
nalisation of negative externalities, that is control of individual fishing eﬀorts2.
However, evidence does suggest that the advent of commercialisation and techno-
logical progress can threaten such schemes (Alexander 1977; Baland and Platteau
1See for instance Maas and Anderson (1986) for detailed historical studies of traditional
irrigation communities in Spain, McKean (1986) for in-depth field investigation of management
of precious communal forest product in Japan, and Alexander (1977) and Schlager (1990) for
informal rules of regulating access to favourable fishing spots in various countries.
2On the basis of comprehensive international case studies of existing institutional arrange-
ments for inshore fisheries management, Schlager (1994) concludes that self-management insti-
tutional arrangement of fisheries, of which rotation is one, do not directly address regulation of
fishing eﬀort.
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1996, pp.199-210; Berkes 1992; Schlager 1994).
Such a pessimistic view about the eﬀectiveness of rotation arrangements seem
to be at odds with other empirical observations of long-lived and sustained practice
of rotation among resource users. Ostrom (1990), for instance, reveals on the
basis of in-depth field observations that rotation of irrigation water in Sri Lankan
village has induced cooperative behaviour among resource users with diﬀering
interests. The documentation of self-management institutions among local fishers
in Japan also suggest that rotational fishing arrangements can also be associated
with the eﬀective control of fish catches (Zengyoren 1992). But why in some cases
do rotation arrangements contribute to internalisation of negative externalities,
while in other cases not? Particularly, why do some rotation arrangements manage
to induce cooperative outcomes while inhibiting competitive pressure to behave
non-cooperatively?
This paper aims to analyse how a rotation scheme influences individual be-
haviour and aﬀects economic outcome in an actual field setting. More specifi-
cally, using unique data on a rotation arrangement between two groups of fishers
in Japan, we examine formally how rotation arrangement induces strategic in-
teractions between the groups, and how this then aﬀects the individual fishing
behaviour and economic outcomes in a particular market environment. These
two groups harvest the same type of shrimp and sell them at the same market.
Except for a few months in which only the first group (Group A) operates, the
two groups adopt a rotation scheme by fishing on alternating days. These two
groups have diﬀerent institutional set-ups: the group A fishers pool income and
fish cooperatively, while in the other group (Group B), the members do not pool
income and fish non-cooperatively. The shrimp is sold daily through an auction
procedure in which buyers are price discriminated. The diﬀerences in the way
the two groups are organised plus the fact that the first group is also observed
operating alone, provides us with a unique opportunity to examine how rotation
combined with increasing competitive pressures aﬀects outcomes.
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In order to obtain theoretical predictions concerning the eﬀects of rotation
arrangement on fishing behaviour, we build a game theoretical model of alternat-
ing duopoly inspired by Maskin and Tirole (1988a). Assuming Markov strategies,
our model shows that the cooperating Group A approximated as a price dis-
criminating monopolist, underproduce in order to prevent pre-emption of future
demand, while Group B, composed of non-cooperative fishers would overproduce
due to intra group competition. However, when the two groups rotate fishing
days, theory suggests that an interesting strategic interdependence arises: the
cooperating group should produce more so as to prevent the non-cooperating
group from unprofitable demand pre-emption. Consequently, under the rotation
arrangement, Group B’s tendency to dissipate rent is reduced, while Group A’s
tendency to uphold price ineﬃciently is mitigated. Adopting Slade’s (1992, 1995)
approach, these theoretical implications are then tested against empirical data.
This paper is organised as follows. In section 2, our field observations are
briefly described. Section 3 presents the baseline case of a price discriminating
monopolist. We show, in congruence with standard theory, that the equilibrium
eﬀort level is Pareto optimal, if members of the group as a whole behave like a price
discriminating monopolist. Section 4 examines oligopolistic competition with price
discrimination and with storability of product. We find that the non-cooperating
group tends to dissipate rent by overproducing. In section 5, we present a final
version of the model with all the elements in place, i.e. alternating arrangement
between the two groups, possibility of price discrimination and partial durability of
shrimp. Section 6 sets out the empirical model, which is then applied to estimate
and test the theoretical implications using our data on Japanese fishers. Section
7 concludes.
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2. Fishermen’s groups in Toyama Prefecture
There are two competing groups of fishermen who operate in the same coastal area
along the Toyama Bay of Shinminato city in Japan. These two groups harvest the
same species, shiroebi (Japanese glass shrimp), and use the same fishing technol-
ogy. Both groups belong to the same local cooperative known as the Shinminato
Fishery Cooperative Association where they are the only two groups entitled to
fish shiroebi. One of these groups, which we call Group A in this study, is com-
posed of seven fishing units and has intra-group cooperation so that members
operate in a coordinated manner and make production decisions collectively. The
second group, Group B, is composed of five units but, unlike Group A, does not
have intra-group coordination. The members of Group B thus operate individu-
ally and make their production decisions non-cooperatively. The two groups have
adopted a rotating system to share the shiroebi stock within the Shinminato area.
Between April and May, and again between September and October, only Group
A is allowed to catch shiroebi. Whereas, between June and August, Groups A
and B operate on alternating days: Group A fishes on Monday, Wednesday and
Friday, and Group B on Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday. Group A has an exclu-
sive fishing right in the former fishing season mainly because of historical reasons.
That is, Group A has specialised in shiroebi fishing for several centuries, while
Group B members have only been allowed to enter this fishery recently (since
1992) after six long years of negotiation with Group A (Platteau and Seki 2001,
for more details of institutional characteristics of the two groups).
On a given fishing day, each boat will make about 4-5 hauls. Since shiroebi is
highly perishable, fishing boats return to the harbour immediately after each haul
in order to land and hand over their catches to fish merchants who wait on the
shore. The fish merchants will then either sell them for immediate consumption or
store them in a deep freezer for future consumption. The sale procedure used to
dispose of the shiroebi is a two-step auctioning system that consists of a ‘morning’
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auction and an aota auction3. The morning auction starts immediately after
the landing of the first hauls of the day which are brought back to shore by
each boat between 5.30 and 6.00 am. All subsequent landings are sold through
the aota auction. Both forms of auctions are characterised as a bidding process
in a descending order. The critical diﬀerence between the ‘morning’ and aota
auctioning mechanisms is that, while the former takes place only after the fish
obtained from the first hauls has been unloaded on the jetty, the latter is held
before actual landings from subsequent hauls are realised. When landing their
first hauls, fishermen are indeed asked to provide an estimate of the total expected
landings of the day, and it is on the basis of such estimates that the aota auction
is held4. In fact, the actual handing over of shiroebi takes place immediately after
the landing and, as a rule, the fish merchant bidding the highest price has priority
access to it, while the other merchants with lower bids are served as subsequent
catches reach the harbour and pay the lower prices to which they have committed
themselves. Consequently, the earlier the shrimp reaches the jetty, the higher the
unit price it fetches. If total landings are less than the estimated supply, some
low bidders will therefore be left without shrimp.
This procedure can be viewed as a variant of the Dutch auction where arbitrage
3‘Aota auction’ literally means the purchasing of a green or standing rice crop, i.e. a forward
purchase.
4The precise steps of the auctioning processes work as follows. (i) An auctioneer declares a
total quantity to be traded; (ii) he then points to a given portion of that quantity for immediate
bidding and proposes a unit price for that portion; (iii) the buyers raise their hands to indicate
the quantity they are willing to buy at the proposed price; (iv) if demand (i.e. the sum of all
the quantities indicated by the traders) does not happen to exceed the size of that portion, the
requests of all fish merchants are met and the auctioneer proposes a lower price to dispose of the
remaining fish in the same portion. If there is excess demand, the auctioneer revises the initial
unit price upwards. The process continues until excess demand is eliminated and the portion is
completely sold. Finally, once the whole portion is disposed of, the auctioneer indicates a new
one to be oﬀered for sale. Another bidding process takes place until the total landings are sold.
7
may occur between catches. Due to possible arbitrage between earlier and later
catches, bids are likely to be lower than actual reservation values5. Nevertheless,
from the above described procedure it follows that fishermen face a downward
sloping eﬀective demand schedule and can price discriminate among the buyers.
Put it diﬀerently, the earlier bidders pay more than the later ones and fishermen
become aware of a downward-sloping demand curve while continuing their fishing
operations. Thus Group A members that fish cooperatively are able to capture
a large surplus when it operates each day, analogous to a price discriminating
monopolist. Whereas Group B members who do not act cooperatively are not
able to reap the same advantages. This is because Group B members face price
uncertainty due to intra-group competition (which will be discussed later in section
4).
The fact that there are two distinct periods, as noted earlier, enables us to
study closely the interactions between the two groups. An empirical analysis of
such interactions requires testable theoretical predictions about the consequences
of strategic interactions between the two groups. In the following sections, we
assume a downward sloping demand schedule and consider Group A as a price
discriminating monopolist. We then build a tractable model by adding successive
complications to the durable-goods monopoly problem.
3. Group A as a price discriminating monopolist
In this section, we analyse the base line case of a price discriminating monopolist
with partly durable goods. To do this we must first construct a consumer demand
5In addition, the Dutch auction is not an exact demand revealing mechanism because the
expected utility maximising bids depend on each bidder’s risk preference and on his/her expecta-
tion about the rivals’ bids. It is known, however, that it induces bidders with higher reservation
values to announce higher bids if all bidders have the same risk preferences and expectations
about the rivals’ reservation values (Phlips 1988, pp.91-95).
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for shrimp. This is not entirely straightforward because there are timing eﬀects
which arise from the storability of the shrimp. Since shrimp can be frozen and
conserved for future consumption, current demand bears upon future demand in
the sense that consumers’ demand for shrimp in a given period is not only to satisfy
current consumption, but also to serve future consumption. The implications of
such storability of shrimp and interdependence of demands across fishing days are
analysed later in this section, but first, for comparsion purposes, we consider the
simple static case with non-durable goods.
3.1. Static framework
First consider the case of consumers who demand shrimp only for present con-
sumption. We consider a group of producers, denoted as Group A, who are the
sole operators in the fishing ground each day. We further assume that group mem-
bers organise production activities cooperatively: they collectively decide levels
of total daily production. In this sense, Group A, as a whole, can be described as
a monopolist. The monopolist producer faces a linear demand schedule:
q = a− bp
where the variables q and p are respectively cumulative output produced by the
monopolist and the corresponding unit prices. a and b are the exogenously given
parameters. Notice that, by virtue of the auctioning system described in section
2, diﬀerent portions of output can be sold at diﬀerent unit prices, and the earlier
landings are sold at higher prices than the later ones. In what follows, we will
denote by p¯, the lowest price above which some positive transactions take place.
We call p¯ the marginal price. Assuming the production technology with a constant
marginal cost, c, the monopolist’s profit function can then be written as:
π =
qZ
0
(p− c) dq.
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From the first-order condition of the monopolist’s profit maximisation problem,
we obtain the equilibrium marginal price, p¯m, output level, q¯m, and profit level,
π¯m, as follows:
p¯m = c (3.1)
q¯m = a− bc (3.2)
π¯m =
1
2b
(a− bc)2 .
Unlike in the case of the classical monopolist whose equilibrium marginal revenue
is greater than the marginal cost, the price discriminating monopolist attains the
Pareto-optimal outcome as implied by (3.1).
We now construct a dynamic setting by considering that shrimp can be stored
and consumed in the following days. Thus we introduce additive cost, δ per
day, for storing harvested shrimp in deep freezers. The current demand faced by
the monopolist producer can therefore be broken down into two parts, a residual
demand on date t for present consumption qtt, and the discounted demand for
future consumption qt+1t . In order to keep the exposition simple, we assume the
followings. The implications of these assumptions for the results are discussed in
section 5.
Assumption 1: One period storability
Harvested shrimp is stored for only one period. This assumption implies the
10
following boundary condition for the discount factor in our algebraic example6:
1
3
³a
b
− c
´
< δ <
1
2
³a
b
− c
´
. (3.3)
Assumption 2: Substitutability of stored shrimp
Harvested shrimp can be frozen and consumed as a substitute for fresh shrimp
by some consumers. Given one-period storability, the demand for consumption in
the next period spills over into the current period, and thus can be written as a
function of price pt, and storage cost δ (i.e., an additive discount factor):
qt+1t = a− b (pt + δ) . (3.4)
This assumption implies that the monopolist faces the following residual de-
mand for current consumption:
qtt = a− bpt − qtt−1
= a− bpt − {a− b (p¯t−1 + δ)}
= b (p¯t−1 + δ)− bpt. (3.5)
The aggregated demand that monopolist faces on day t has a kink at pt = ab − δ :
qt = b (p¯t−1 + δ)− bpt, if pt >
a
b
− δ, (3.6)
= a− b(2pt − p¯t−1), if pt ≤
a
b
− δ.
Figure 3.1 shows a graphical illustration of the demand curve (3.6). The products
priced above the kink level, ab − δ, are for immediate consumption, while the
6The assumption of one period spill-over is implied by:
a
b
− 2δ < p¯mt <
a
b
− δ.
Using the equilibrium marginal price for the monopolist producer (3.10), this is equivalent to:
a
b
− 2δ < c+ δ < a
b
− δ.
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tp
tq
b
a
tp
δ−ba
δ+tp
q
Demand curve at t
Discounted demand for 
future consumption at  
t+1 Demand for present 
consumption at t 
0
Figure 3.1: Demand curve in period t when harvested products are storable
products with prices lower than the kink level are partly purchased for immediate
consumption and partly for future consumption.
The monopolist maximises the following profit function:
ΠM =
∞X
t=0
ηtπt =
∞X
t=0
ηt
¡
πtt + π
t+1
t
¢
(3.7)
where πt denotes instantaneous profit from day t that can be broken down into
πtt , the profits from the sales to consumers with contemporaneous demand, and
πt+1t , the profit gained from selling to those who store them for future consump-
tion. The variable η is a usual time discount factor which we set equal to one in
this study. Since the changes in marginal price p¯t only aﬀect πtt, π
t+1
t and π
t+1
t+1,
the monopolist’s intertemporal profit maximisation problem (3.7) can be simply
written as:
Max
p¯t
¡
πtt + π
t+1
t + π
t+1
t+1
¢
. (3.8)
From the first-order condition of the above problem, we have:
2b (c− p¯mt ) + b (p¯mt + δ − c) = 0. (3.9)
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The equilibrium marginal price is therefore:
p¯mt = c+ δ. (3.10)
Since the second-order condition is satisfied, (3.10) corresponds to a global maxi-
mum. Equation (3.10) characterises a stable equilibrium, in the sense that starting
from any level of marginal price, the marginal price will reach this equilibrium level
and remain stationary.
From (3.10), we obtain the following equilibrium levels of output and profit
respectively
−
q
m
t = a− b (c+ δ) , (3.11)
−
π
m
t =
1
2b
(a− bc)2 − δ
2
(2a− 2bc− 3bδ) . (3.12)
Selling products for future consumption at a discounted price inevitably implies
losing some profit in the future period as depicted in (3.12). Since the monopolist
is unable to diﬀerentiate present and future consumers, the producer surplus will
be reduced by preempting future demand. Henceforth, we call this eﬀect, “demand
preemption”. In order to prevent future consumers from preempting demand, the
monopolist therefore tends to ineﬃciently raise the marginal price by restricting
output. In other words, when product is partially durable, a price discriminating
monopolist will under-produce so as to avoid the unprofitable demand preemption
eﬀect.
It is interesting to contrast the above with the Coase conjecture. In the Coase
conjecture, the standard durable-goods monopolist is unable to price discriminate
intertemporally. In such a circumstance, the monopolist tends to lose market
power as his pricing decision today creates his own future competition. Being
unable to price discriminate, the monopolist is obliged, in the limit, to charge the
competitive marginal price as “the producer of an infinitely durable good loses
all his monopoly power when the period between his price adjustments converges
13
j’s strategy
One haul Two hauls
i’s strategy One haul x,x y,z
Two hauls z,y w,w
Table 4.1: Payoﬀ structure of two fishermen with two strategies
to zero” (Tirole 1988, p.81). When the monopolist producer can price discrimi-
nate among buyers, as in our model, the durable-goods monopolist will raise the
equilibrium marginal price so as to prevent future demand pre-emption.
4. Group B as a price discriminating oligopoly
In this section, we examine the other group, Group B, composed of non-cooperative
producers. First, we consider the static case without storability of shrimp, we then
incorporate the partial storability.
4.1. Static framework
As explained in section 2, landed shrimp fetches diﬀerent prices in accordance
with the timing of landings. The existing auction system allows fishermen to
behave as a price discriminating monopolist, provided they can agree to coordinate
their production decisions. Without such coordination, each fisherman faces the
situation in which he trades oﬀ the incentive to fish competitively for a larger
quantity on the one hand, or to fish less to sell at higher prices on the other. In
order to take account of such tradeoﬀs, let us consider a simple case in which
two identical fishermen operate non-cooperatively and they decide whether to
make one haul or two hauls during one fishing trip. The payoﬀ structure of this
game can be represented as the bi-matrix in Table 4.1. Note that if both fishers
choose either strategies of One haul or Two hauls in an equilibrium, they will
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land simultaneously, i.e. the probabilities of landing first or second is 1
2
. As in the
previous section, demand for shrimp is represented as:
q = a− bp.
Fisherman i’s expected payoﬀ can be written as:
Eπi (qi, qj) =
qZ
0
[Ep (qi, qj)− c] dqi
whereEp (qi, qj) is the expected prices for fisherman i’s landing. Ep (qi, qj) = ab−
qi
b
when i lands first, while Ep (qi, qj) = ab −
qi+qj
b when i lands second. There are
three main cases to consider: (a) x < z and y < w, (b) x > z and y > w, and (c)
x = z and y = w. Since:
x =
1
2
2q¯Z
0
³a
b
− c− q
b
´
dq
y =
q¯Z
0
³a
b
− c− q
b
´
dq
z =
2q¯Z
0
µ
a
b
− c− q + q¯
b
¶
dq
w =
1
2
4q¯Z
0
³a
b
− c− q
b
´
dq,
we obtain the following results.
Case (a) x < z and y < w⇐⇒ a− bc > 7
2
q¯. Strategy Two (to make two hauls)
strictly dominates strategy One (to make one haul), thus both fishers make two
hauls and land simultaneously in equilibrium.
Case (b) x > z and y > w ⇐⇒ a − bc < 7
2
q¯. Strategy One strictly domi-
nates Two. Thus, both fishers make just one haul and land simultaneously in
equilibrium.
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Case (c) x = z and y = w⇐⇒ a− bc = 7
2
q¯. All strategies (One, Two, and any
mixed strategies of One and Two) are equilibrium strategies.
From the above, it is implied that when demand is relatively elastic, i.e. small
b and large a−bc, as typically in Case (a), the incentive to fish is stronger resulting
in simultaneous landings of larger quantities. Conversely, when a− bc is relatively
small, i.e., demand is less elastic, as in Case (b), the incentive to fish less for
possibly higher prices becomes stronger and oﬀsets the incentive to fish more
to some extent. Intuitively, this is because when price elasticity of demand is
small enough, the potential gains from fishing less for higher prices become more
compelling. Case (c) is a trivial situation in which each fisher is indiﬀerent between
choosing strategy One or Two regardless of the other’s strategy. Further, the
range of elasticity of demand under which two fishers both decide to fish One
haul diminishes as the number of group member increases, while the range that
generates mixed strategy equilibria expands7. In this paper, we adopt a simple
model with two fishers and concentrate our attention on the case in which demand
is suﬃciently elastic so that incentive to fish more is dominant. This makes the
analysis of the strategic interactions between the two groups tractable when there
is significant competition among non-cooperative fishers.
The expected inverse demand function of two non-cooperative fishers can
therefore be written as:
Epi (qi, qj) ≡
1
2
³a
b
− qi
b
´
+
1
2
µ
a
b
− qi + qj
b
¶
.
Assuming no risk aversion, individual producer i’s profit maximising problem
7Mixed strategy equilibria give rise to a situation in which homogeneous fishers choose to
land at diﬀerent times and may experience the trade-oﬀ between landing early for higher prices
and fishing longer for larger quantities. Analysis of such mixed strategy equilibria, though
interesting, is beyond the scope of this paper.
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becomes:
Max
qi
Eπi (qi, qj) =Max
qi
qiZ
0
[Epi (qi, qj)− c] dqi. (4.1)
Taking the first-order condition of (4.1), we obtain³a
b
− q¯i
b
− c
´
+
µ
a
b
− q¯i + q¯j
b
− c
¶
= 0. (4.2)
Symmetric reaction function can be written as:
q¯i (q¯j) = a− bc−
q¯j
2
.
The Nash equilibrium level of output, q¯Ni becomes
q¯Ni =
2
3
(a− bc) , (4.3)
and the corresponding levels of total quantity, marginal price and profit are:
q¯N =
4
3
(a− bc) , (4.4)
p¯N = c− 1
3
³a
b
− c
´
< c, and (4.5)
π¯N =
1
2b
(a− bc)2
µ
8
9
¶
.
Comparing the above with (3.1) and (3.2), we can state the following.
Result 4.1: Rent-dissipation eﬀect with price uncertainty:
Two non cooperative producers will over-produce when they can price discrim-
inate among buyers but they are uncertain about the price schedules they actually
face.
It is noteworthy, that when the price elasticity of demand is low, the “rent-
dissipation” eﬀect becomes milder. This is consistent with the previous observa-
tion that the incentive to fish more is reduced when the demand becomes inelastic.
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4.2. Dynamic framework with two myopic producers
Let us now turn to the group of two non-cooperative producers in a dynamic
setting with demand interdependence. First we consider the situation in which
two producers are myopic in the sense that they maximise the expected payoﬀ
from the current period only. The expected profit of producer i on day t can be
written as:
Eπi,t =
1
2
qiZ
0
[pt (qi)− c] dqi +
1
2
qiZ
0
[pt (qi + qj)− c] dqi. (4.6)
As we have seen in Figure 3.1, fishermen face demand curve with a kink at p =
a
b −δ. It is therefore useful for the purpose of identifying the equilibrium outcomes
to distinguish two cases depending on the location of the kink. In the following
sections, we therefore refer to the following two cases; case (i) when the market
is relative large (i.e., large ab − c) , and case (ii) when the market is relatively
thin (i.e., small ab − c). The individual equilibrium output levels and the marginal
prices for the two cases are as follows (see Appendix A for a formal proof):
Equilibrium marginal prices:
(i) p¯Mt = c−
a− bc
7b
, when
a
b
− c > 7
6
δ (4.7)
(ii) p¯Mt = c+
a− bc− 2bδ
5b
,when
a
b
− c ≤ 7
6
δ (4.8)
Equilibrium individual output levels:
(i) q¯Mi =
4
7
(a− bc) (4.9)
(ii) q¯Mi =
2
5
(a− bc) + bδ
5
(4.10)
From (4.7) and (4.8), we observe p¯Mt ≤ c − δ6 in both cases. This implies that
the rent dissipation eﬀect persists in the dynamic setting with demand spill-overs.
By comparing (4.9) and (4.10) with (4.3), we notice in case (i), the equilibrium
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output level with inter-temporal demand spill-over turns out to be smaller than
the equilibrium output level without demand spill-over. This is because, when δ
is relatively small, a greater proportion of future demand, qt+1t , spills over into
current period and generates a demand preemption eﬀect in the sense that
the highly priced portion of demand is pre-empted by the quantity supplied at low
marginal prices in the previous day. On the other hand, when δ is relatively large,
as in the case (ii), the equilibrium output level become greater with the demand
spill-over than without it. As both rent-dissipation and demand preemption eﬀects
are simultaneously at work, we observe,
Result 4.2: Suppose duopolists can price discriminate buyers and the pro-
duced goods are partially durable. Suppose also they maximise instantaneous
profit without taking account of future profit. Then, when storage costs are rel-
atively small (or market is large), the demand preemption eﬀects oﬀsets some of
the rent dissipation eﬀect arising from competition between the duopolists. As
storage costs become larger (or market size diminishes), the rent dissipation eﬀect
becomes more prominent.
4.3. Dynamic framework with two non-myopic producers
In this subsection, we consider the case of non-myopic duopolists that maximise
their intertemporal expected payoﬀ. Following the same steps as in section 3,
the non-myopic producers’ expected inter-temporal profit maximisation can be
simplified to:
Max
pt
¡
Eπtt +Eπ
t+1
t +Eπ
t+1
t+1
¢
.
Equilibrium marginal prices of the two non-myopic producers pNMt , for the two
cases are (detailed derivations are included in Appendix B):
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(i) pNMt = c+
7a− 8bδ − 3bc
23
, when
a
b
− 117c
135
>
7
6
δ +
δ
30
(4.11)
(ii) pNMt = c+
9a− 12bδ − 7bc
27
, when
a
b
− 117c
135
≤ 7
6
δ +
δ
30
. (4.12)
Comparing these with (4.7) and (4.8), we observe the followings. When δ is
relatively small, notably in the case (i), the equilibrium marginal price of non-
myopic agents may become greater than that of myopic agents, i.e. pNMt > p
N
t .
While when δ is relatively large, or demand is fairly inelastic, the marginal price
with non-myopic fishers becomes lower than myopic ones, i.e. pNMt ≤ pNt . This
implies that if δ is suﬃciently small then the expected payoﬀ of non myopic fishers
is higher than the case when both producers behave myopically. This is because
non-myopic fishers are able to prevent demand pre-emption eﬀect by curtailing
output levels. On the other hand, if δ is suﬃciently large then non-myopic fishers
tend to increase output as expected gains override the expected losses from pre-
empting future demand.
5. The alternating duopoly between Groups A and B
In summary, Group A is composed of cooperative members so that decisions
concerning the aggregate level of output are made collectively and thus Group A
as a whole can behave like a price discriminating monopolist. When the harvested
shrimp is storable, Group A tends to under-produce by setting the marginal price
higher than the marginal cost so as to prevent unprofitable demand preemption.
The second group, Group B, is composed of two non-cooperative members who
decide individually how much to produce by setting an expected marginal revenue
equal to a marginal cost. As a result, given a suﬃciently elastic demand and a
substantial storage cost, Group B as a whole tends to over-produce and dissipates
the rent. The goal in this section is to examine how Groups A and B should behave
20
when they alternate fishing by day in the presence of price discrimination and
intertemporal demand spill-overs due to partial durability of harvested shrimp.
Here, alternating duopoly is considered as a rotation scheme in which duopolists
take turns to produce. What is important is the fact that the rotation allows pro-
ducers to react immediately to the opponents/competitors. Such strategic inter-
actions embodied in the alternating duopoly have been analysed comprehensively
by Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole in a series of articles (1987, 1988a, 1988b). We
adopt, in this section, the approach of Maskin and Tirole (1988a) to study the be-
haviour of alternating groups by taking the rotating system as exogenously given
and by restricting the fishermen to Markov strategies. Under the Markov assump-
tion, the players use only the most recent history, unlike in a standard repeated
game analysis model in which agents typically take into account an entire history
including one’s own past actions. Though restrictive, the Markov assumption has
some intuitive appeal and is justifiable when people are committed to a rotation
scheme: one producer is committed to a particular action in one period–whether
a quantity or a price – that cannot be altered for a finite period during which the
other producer moves. Such a commitment naturally implies that recent actions
have a stronger bearing on current and future payoﬀs than those of the more dis-
tant past (Maskin and Tirole 1988a, p.553). Moreover, the Markov assumption
ensures that “players use the same strategies in identical subgames (Slade 1995,
p.370)”. From this it follows that “if we start a game in a period that is chosen
so that everything that matters from an economic point of view is the same as
in the first period, behaviour should remain unchanged” (ibid.). In a nutshell,
the Markov strategy limits players to respond only to the payoﬀ relevant history
and enables us to transform the dynamic features of the interactions between the
alternating groups into a reduced-form static competition.
In this section we assume myopic behaviour of Group B members, and that
they maximise instantaneous profit. This assumption will be tested in our data
but there are a number of reasons why, a priori, this would appear a reasonable
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working hypothesis. First, when δ is relatively small, it may become profitable
for an individual member of Group B to deviate from the myopic behaviour by
taking future benefits into consideration. However, such profitable deviation is
diﬃcult, because the reduction of instantaneous income from producing less in
current period is solely borne by the deviating individual, while the future gain
derived from increased future residual demand is distributed equally among the
Group B members. Secondly it is intuitive to think that a rotation scheme with
Group A makes future expected benefit of Group B members far less important,
which drives them to behave myopically.
5.1. Alternating moves between Groups A and B
Let us first describe the rotating sequence of quantity and marginal price setting.
On each day, only one of the two groups produces and earns income. At day t,
Group A operates and produces qt with a corresponding marginal price p¯t. Its
instantaneous profit is denoted as πt. In day t + 1, Group B members will have
observed p¯t and qt, and produce non-cooperatively. We denote the instantaneous
profit accruing to member i of Group B as πi,t+1. On day t + 2, Group A ob-
serves the marginal price of the previous day, p¯t+1 and qt+1, and produces qt+2 by
choosing p¯t+2. This rotating sequence continues infinitely.
As we have discussed in the previous sections, producers can price discriminate
among buyers on each day and harvested shrimp can be stored with an additive
cost δ for one day. This storability of shrimp makes the demand for future con-
sumption spill-over into the present day. Consequently, Group A can no longer
take full advantage of being a price discriminating monopolist. Instead, Groups
A and B are made to interact as alternating-move duopolists.
Table 5.1 summarises the demand, for current and future consumption, faced
by the groups on respective days. Notice in Table 5.1 that each group’s decision
depends only on the marginal price of the competitor on the previous day.
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Days t t+ 1 t+ 2
Operating group A B A
Demand for current qtt q
t+1
t+1 q
t+2
t+2
period consumption = b (pt−1 + δ)− bpt = b (pt + δ)− bpt+1 = b (pt+1 + δ)− bpt+2
Discounted demand for qt+1t q
t+2
t+1 q
t+3
t+2
next period consumption = a− b (pt + δ) = a− b (pt+1 + δ) = a− b (pt+2 + δ)
Table 5.1: Decomposition of demand faced by Groups A and B
Some remarks are in order. First, in our problem, the rotation arrangement
is exogenous. Secondly, decisions over quantity and marginal price have the same
meaning since marginal revenue and demand schedules coincide. Thus, regardless
of whether we take marginal prices or output levels as choice variables, our results
remain the same. So Group A’s problem is solved as a price analogue of Cournot
competition.
Let us suppose that Group A operates on odd-numbered days; t = 2k − 1
and Group B in even-numbered days; t = 2k, k = 1, 2, · · · . Let the marginal
costs of the production technologies available for Groups A and B be constant
and denoted by cA and cB, respectively. On day t, Group A’s instantaneous profit
πt is a function of the current marginal price pt and the marginal price of the
previous day pt−1. This instantaneous profit can be further broken down into the
profit from selling to current consumers πtt and the profit from selling to future
consumers πt+1t . From the Markov assumption, Group A’s strategy depends only
on the pay-oﬀ relevant state variable, i.e., the marginal price of the previous day.
We can thus write:
πt = πt
¡
pt, pt−1
¢
= πtt
¡
pt, pt−1
¢
+ πt+1t (pt) .
Group A will maximise the sum of the discounted future profit, given the marginal
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price of Group B on the previous day, pt−1 :
Max
pt
£
πt
¡
pt, pt−1
¢
+ ηπt+2
¡
pt+2, pt+1
¢
+ η2πt+4
¡
pt+4, pt+3
¢
+ · · · ¤ (5.1)
where η is the time discount factor. The Markov assumption also allows us to
introduce the following valuation function for Group A8:
V A (pt) =Maxpt
£
πt
¡
pt, pt−1
¢
+ ηWA (pt)
¤
(5.2)
WA (pt) = πt+2
¡
pt+2, pt+1
¢
+ ηV A
¡
pt+2
¢
. (5.3)
The second term in (5.2) is the discounted value of the profit from the future, which
will be maximised at day t+2, the next time Group A operates. In this formula-
tion, “the future appears as the same starting from next time period (Maskin and
Tirole 1988a, p.552).” Consequently, the intertemporal maximisation problem in
(5.1) can be reduced to the maximisation problem concerning the relevant time
period only. In other words, we can concentrate on the maximisation problem
of the present value of profits in the future so long as the current action has an
impact. We can now rewrite Group A’s maximisation problem in the following
reduced-form:
Max
pt
£
πt
¡
pt, pt−1
¢
+ ηπt+2
¡
pt+2, pt+1
¢¤
. (5.4)
The profit function in (5.4) can be further decomposed as:
Max
pt
£
πtt
¡
pt, pt−1
¢
+ πt+1t (pt) + ηπ
t+2
t+2
¡
pt+2, pt+1 (pt)
¢
+ ηπt+3t+2
¡
pt+2
¢¤
. (5.5)
Notice that the last term in the objective function (5.5) is irrelevant for today’s
decision, since it will be considered in the maximisation on the future day, t+ 2.
Finally, letting η = 1, the relevant reduced-form problem of Group A becomes:
Max
pt
£
πtt
¡
pt, pt−1
¢
+ πt+1t (pt) + π
t+2
t+2
¡
pt+2, pt+1 (pt)
¢¤
(5.6)
8These valuation equations originate from dynamic programming. More detailed exposition
of the dynamic programming equations can be found in Tirole (1988a, pp.265-266).
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s.t. pt+1 (pt) = RB (pt) .
whereRB (pt) represents the marginal price determination of Group B with respect
to the marginal price chosen by Group A in the previous day t. We consider by
virtue of intra-group cooperation, Group A behaves as a leader: it chooses the
marginal price on day t, anticipating Group B’s actions on day t+1, which will in
turn aﬀect Group A’s profit on day t+2. We first need to solve the problem with
Group B as a follower. As in the preceding sections, Group B members behave
non-cooperatively and maximise the following individual expected profit:
Max
qti
Eπi,t
¡
qti , q
t
j
¢
.
To solve Group B’s problem, we follow the same steps taken in Subsection 4.2.
Using the results (4.7) and (4.8), we obtain two expressions for the Nash equilib-
rium marginal prices attained by Group B on day t+ 1 given the marginal price
chosen by Group A on previous day t. Since we assume that Group B members
behave myopically and maximise instantaneous profit, the derived marginal price
determination equations of Group B in each period can be written as follows:
(i) p¯t+1 = R
B (p¯t) =
8bcB − a− bp¯t
6b
, when
5a
b
− 4cB > p¯t + 6δ
(ii) p¯t+1 = R
B (p¯t) =
4bcB + a− bp¯t − 2bδ
4b
, when
5a
b
− 4cB ≤ p¯t + 6δ.
Solving (5.6) for each case obtains the results shown in Table 5.2 (step by step
derivations are shown in Appendix C). Group A always chooses a marginal price
lower than its marginal cost. This aggressive behaviour of Group A is a strategic
reaction to the rent-dissipation eﬀect caused by non-cooperative Group B mem-
bers. To put it another way, over-production of Group B implies preemption of
the high value demand faced by Group A, which depresses Group A’s profit on the
subsequent day. Anticipating this, Group A tries to maximise profit by drastically
undercutting the marginal price. Such a strategy of Group A, in return, prevents
Group B from producing a rent-dissipation eﬀect.
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Case (i) Case (ii)
p¯A < cA p¯A < cA
p¯B < cB + δ cB < p¯B < cB + δ
when cA = cB = c, pB < pA when cA = cB = c, pB > pA
Table 5.2: Equilibrium marginal prices for Groups A and B
To gain further insights from these results, it is useful to recall that individual
decisions of Group B’s members are made on the basis of their ‘expected’ mar-
ginal revenue, which lies above the actual demand. Group A is able to correct
this expected price schedule by demand preemption. In other words, Group A en-
croaches upon the highly priced portion of the demand schedule faced by Group
B. Particularly when the discount factor δ is large and/or demand is relatively
inelastic (i.e. large b), typically in the case (ii), demand preemption by Group B
implies a serious marginal loss of highly valued portion of demand faced by Group
A. Group A will then take vigorous action to recoup the highly valued portion of
the demand by undercutting the marginal prices.
The basic intuition gained from our analysis is robust in more general settings,
particularly in a model with infinite storability and imperfect substitutability of
stored shrimp. In our model, partial durability imposes a lower bound on the
storage cost δ. Relaxing this changes the shape of demand curve (with multiple
kinks at ab−δ,
a
b−2δ,
a
b−3δ · · · ) and the equilibrium outcome, but it does not alter
the fundamental nature of demand interactions. For instance, infinite durability
implies an infinitely small value of δ, that is the special case of (i). Imperfect
substitutability between stored and fresh shrimp implies that stored shrimp is not
substitutable for the higher valued portion of demand but only substitutable for
the lower valued part. Then the theoretical implications of the static framework
can be applied to the market of high valued products, while the basic intuitions
gained in this section remain applicable to the lower valued ones.
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There may be a possibility of collusion between Groups A and B in which
Group A’s monopolistic outcome is realised everyday. Such a collusive outcome
could be sustained when the two groups agree on a punishment rule where, in
the event of a deviation, the group switches to Nash behaviour the following day,
provided that the time discount rate is low enough to make a one period deviation
unprofitable. If there is a promising oﬀer of collusion with Group A, Group B
members may be encouraged to establish a collective production arrangement.
6. Empirical evidence
6.1. Model specification
The central implication of the theoretical analysis is that in the presence of price
discrimination and partial durability of the products, the rotation scheme between
Groups A and B makes them interact as alternating duopolists. Consequently,
the model predicts that, due to the strategic interactions between the groups, the
equilibrium marginal price of Group A becomes significantly lower when the two
groups rotate fishing days than when only Group A fishes daily.
In this section, we attempt to verify the validity of the alternating duopoly
model in the observed rotation arrangement using original field data. We first esti-
mate the marginal price determination equation in which our alternating duopoly
model is nested. After testing for validity of parameters implied by the theoretical
model, we then proceed to estimate the marginal prices of the two groups for the
first period when only Group A operates and for the second when both Groups A
and B fish on alternating days.
Following the estimation strategy of alternating duopoly proposed in Slade
(1992), we estimate a marginal price determination equation. While Slade (1992)
simultaneously estimates the supply and demand of gasoline producers as dynamic
oligopoly, we examine only the supply behaviour of the alternating duopoly pro-
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ducers. This is because, in our setting, the demand schedule is known by the
producers while they continue fishing, so the producers can price discriminate
among the buyers. These facts imply that the demand schedule is already incor-
porated in the supply behaviour chosen by the producers. We therefore sidestep
the estimation of demand equation and examine the following marginal price de-
termination equation:
p¯t = α+ β1Group ∗ Season ∗ p¯t+1 + β2 (1−Group) ∗ p¯t+1 (6.1)
+ γ1 (1− Season) ∗ p¯t+1 + γ2 (1−Group) ∗ p¯t−1
+D1Season+D2Group ∗ Season+D3Day +D4Day ∗ Season+ εt
where dummy variables for Group and Seasons are set as Group=1 for Group
A, and 0 for Group B, Season=0 for April - May when only Group A operates,
and Season=1 for June - August when Groups A and B operate alternately. Day
dummies control for possible influences arising from particular days of the week.
Coeﬃcients β1 and γ1 reflect Group A’s intertemporal reactions in the second
and the first season respectively. According our model of alternating duopoly,
they are expected to take positive values. Coeﬃcient β2 captures Group B’s
intertemporal reaction while γ2 reflects Group B’s myopic behaviour. That is, if
γ2 is positive and significant but β2 is not significant, the hypothesis of myopic
behaviour of Group B is not rejected by the data.
The theoretical model predicts that prices should be lower when Groups A and
B alternates. By calculating the equilibrium marginal prices using the estimated
model parameters, it allows us to further examine the consistency of the empirical
model with the theory.
After testing for the validity of the specification of the marginal determination
equation and underlying model of alternating duopoly, but before we proceed
to estimate the equilibrium marginal prices, constancy of estimated parameters
must be tested. As discussed in Slade (1992), we do this by testing it against
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April-May June-August
Group A α+D3
1−γ1
(1+β)(α+D1)+D2+β1(D3+D4)
1−β1(β2+γ2)
Group B (1+β2+γ2)(α+D1)+γ2D2+D3+D4
1−β1(β2+γ2)
Table 6.1: Equilibrium marginal prices
an alternative hypothesis of gradual changes in the parameters using residual
diagnostics.
If the constancy of the estimated parameters is not rejected, we can calculate
the implied equilibriummarginal prices as follows (Slade 1995). Assuming Markov
strategies, the dynamic marginal price determination process can be approximated
by dynamic reaction functions:
April - May:
p¯t − p∗ = R (p¯t+1 − p∗) , t = 1, 2, 3 · · · (6.2)
June - August:
p¯t − p∗A = RA (p¯t+1 − p∗B) , t = 2k − 1, k = 1, 2, 3 · · · (6.3)
p¯t − p∗B = RB (p¯t−1 − p∗A) + fRB (p¯t+1 − p∗A) , t = 2k, k = 1, 2, 3 · · · (6.4)
where p∗, p∗A and p
∗
B are the long-run equilibrium marginal prices, and R, RA, RB
and gRB measure intertemporal responses of Group A and Group B. Solving the
above equations for equilibrium marginal prices, we obtain equilibrium marginal
prices as shown in Table 6.1 (Appendix D contains step by step derivations).
6.2. Description of the data
The data set of daily transactions of Shiroebi collected by Shinminato Fishery
Cooperative Association is used for the analysis. Details of each transaction such
as unit prices, quantities, identities of buyers, and identities of producers (in
the case of Group B), are recorded by auctioneers and collated electronically for
the Cooperative’s accounting purposes. Table 6.2 shows some basic information
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April~May June~August  
Group A Group B 
Number of  fishing days per month 19.5 12.7 12.3 
Lowest price of each fishing day (yen/kg)  1274.8 (228.6) 811.9 (130.0) 824.3 (177.8) 
Total landings per day (kg) 1358.2 (625.5) 1804.8  (1198.3) 932.1 (477.1) 
Highest price of each fishing day (yen/kg) 1771.0 (524.4) 1164.6 (522.2) 1381.7 (603.6) 
Average price (yen/kg) 1457.4 (280.6) 898.4 (162.0) 1025.3 (223.3) 
Average monthly landings (kg) 25,862 29,776 
Average monthly revenue (1000 yen) 38,650 29,930 
Notes: 94 observations on 30 fishing days in April~May and 64 fishing days in June~August, of which 
34 days of Group A and 30 days of Group B, are used.  Standard deviations are shown in brackets. 
Table 6.2: Means and standard deviations of price and daily landings
on 2,281 transactions that took place during 94 fishing days between April and
August 1997 (30 fishing days in April-May and 64 fishing days in June-August).
From the table it is clear that more fishing took place during the second season
than in the first season. In fact, Groups A and B operated during more than 85%
of the total number of possible fishing days in the latter period, compared with a
proportion of only 65% during the former season. For Group A, the mean daily
landings in the latter season were higher than those in the first season at 95%
confidence level (p value of the one-sided test of equal mean is 0.0359). Consistent
with this, the mean value of the lowest prices in the first season is 1,274.8 yen/kg,
significantly higher than 811.9 yen/kg for the second season (p-value of the one-
sided test of equal mean is less than 0.0001). Mean values of the highest and
average prices of each fishing day also indicate that the daily demand schedule in
the second season is significantly depressed relative to that in the first season (p
values of F-test are 0.0001 and less than 0.0001 respectively). Finally, aggregated
monthly landings and revenues for Groups A and B are greater and smaller in the
season respectively.
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6.3. Results
We use OLS procedure to estimate the parameters of the marginal price deter-
mination equation (6.1). Estimation [1] in Table 6.3 reports results of a general
model. The results of more restricted models are shown in column [2] and in Ap-
pendix D. As the estimation [1] provides our initial test of the theoretical model,
we focus our attention on this specification.
First, overall, the model appears to fit the data satisfactorily. The high R
2
indicates that it explains a high proportion of the variance in p¯t, the lowest price
of each fishing day, while residual diagnostics do not suggest serious misspec-
ification. Using the White test the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is not
rejected (p-value = 0.2987), while the Durbin-Watson Test confirms no serious
autocorrelation. Second, the signs and significances of estimated parameters are
consistent with the theoretical model. The coeﬃcients β1, γ1, and γ2 are positive
and significant, while the coeﬃcient β2 is not significant. Furthermore, there are
no significant seasonal eﬀects except through interaction terms with Saturday and
Group9.
As in Slade (1992), the residual diagnostics also provide a formal test of pa-
rameter constancy against an alternative hypothesis of gradual changes in the
parameters. As these appear satisfactory, this suggests the use of the constant
parameter model to compute the equilibrium marginal prices is valid.
The restricted model estimation which is consistent with the theoretical model
is reported in the column [2]. Although the significance of coeﬃcient β1 falls to
the 10% level, the overall specification remains satisfactory and consistent with
the underlying model of alternating duopoly. Hence the parameters from this
estimation are used to calculate the equilibrium marginal prices.
9Other possible extraneous influences may be associated with specific days of the week, such
as Monday for the beginning of the week, Wednesday when there is no prefectural wholesale
market, and Saturday for weekends, and national holidays. The eﬀects of these days were found
to be statistically insignificant.
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 [1] [2] 
α : Constant 432.16** (151.04) 521.23**(157.78) 
β1 : 1** +tpSeasonGroup  0.2339* (0.1031) 0.2168φ (0.1103) 
β2: 1*)1( +− tpGroup  0.2822 (0.2488)  
γ1 : ( 11 )* tseason p +−  0.6674** (0.1163) 0.5842** (0.1206) 
γ2: 1*)1( −− tpGroup  0.5472* (0.2317) 0.7009** (0.2184) 
D1: Season -330.68 (251.26) -263.79 (238.48) 
D2: Group*Season 502.99* (220.71) 367.12φ (204.36) 
D3: Saturday 108.04 (87.167)  
D4: Saturday*Season 71.723 (102.15)  
2R  0.7510 0.6958 
White test for homoskedasticity 0.2987 0.3609 
Skewness/Kurtosis test for normality 0.5097 0.2080 
Durbin-Watson 
d-statistic 
1.6350 
(dL=1.489, dU=1.852)
1.5684 
(dL=1.557, dU=1.778) 
Notes: In each model, the dependent variable is the lowest price of each fishing day.  Standard 
deviations are shown in brackets. **, *, and φ denote significance at 99%, 95%, and 90% levels of 
confidence, respectively. 94 observations of lowest prices of Shiroebi sold between 1st April 1997 and 
30 August 1997 are used for the estimation.  
Table 6.3: Estimation of marginal price determination equation
April-May June-August
Group A 1253.56 802.33
Group B - 819.80
Table 6.4: Estimated equilibrium marginal prices
Table 6.4 reports the estimated equilibrium marginal prices. The estimated
marginal equilibrium prices implied by alternating duopoly model are consistent
with the theoretical prediction: the equilibrium marginal price of Group A is
lower in the second season than in the first season. In addition, the predicted
equilibrium prices appear relatively close to the actual mean value of the lowest
price of each fishing day given in Table 6.2. This provides additional evidence of
model validity.
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7. Concluding remarks
This paper investigates how rotation arrangement may induce strategic interac-
tions between two groups of fishermen, which then aﬀects the individual fishing
behaviour and economic outcomes in a particular market environment, charac-
terised by price discrimination and product durability. In order to obtain theo-
retical predictions concerning the eﬀects of the rotation arrangement on fishing
behaviour, we build a game theoretical model of alternating duopoly inspired by
Maskin and Tirole (1988a).
Our theoretical model suggests that the rotation system induces strategic in-
teractions between the groups. Group A, with a collective arrangement, behaves
like a price discriminating monopolist and tends to uphold prices ineﬃciently in
order to discourage consumers from pre-empting demand. Group B composed of
non-cooperative fishermen tends to overproduce, given suﬃciently elastic demand.
The model reveals that the rotation scheme where fishing days are alternated has
some interesting theoretical predictions: it reduces Group B’s tendency to dissi-
pate rent on the one hand, and mitigates Group A’s tendency to uphold price in-
eﬃciently on the other. The model is estimated and tested using data of Japanese
fishermen. The evidence suggests that behaviour of the two groups is consistent
with the predictions of the alternating duopoly model.
Some remarks on more general insights gained from this study are in order.
The most noteworthy is that we have shown that rotation may induce strate-
gic interdependencies through which cooperative outcomes are realised through
non-cooperative individual action. Unlike in the case of cooperation sustained by
reputation eﬀects, the cooperative outcomes discussed in the paper are achieved
without relying on repeated interactions. While most of field studies of rota-
tion emphasise that the eﬀects of rotation arrangements are limited to promoting
equity, the present paper shows that it has potential to enhance eﬃciency. In
particular, this study demonstrates that, in certain circumstances, there need not
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be an eﬃciency-equity trade-oﬀ.
Further, it shows the way in which cooperation in one group can aﬀect non-
cooperative behaviour in the other via particular institutional arrangements. The
social capital literature has emphasised the diﬃculty of maintaining cooperative
norms in a competitive economic environment, particularly where there are non-
cooperative actors (Portes and Landolt 2000). We have demonstrated that a
rotation scheme can give rise to strategic interactions between cooperative and
non-cooperative groups through demand interlinkages, which produce positive
spill-overs. That is, it makes the non-cooperative actors refrain from unprof-
itable demand preemption and behave seemingly cooperatively. The conditions
under which the positive ‘contagion’ of the cooperative outcomes demonstrated
in this paper occurs is obviously one area for further research10.
Our paper also provides a specific empirical example of how the community
enforcement of social norms might emerge among non-cooperative agents as sug-
gested by Kandori (1992) and Postewaite and Okuno-Fujiwara (1995). These
authors do not specify explicitly how such norms are actually transmitted and
influence individual incentives. Our analysis shows that a specific institutional
arrangement (i.e. rotation system) may give rise to a particular information
structure and strategic interactions between the groups conducive for producing
cooperative ontcomes.
In developing countries, the continuous encroachment of competitive forces,
population pressure and the gradual erosion of tradition co-operative norms would
appear to threaten the management of common resources vital for so many. Our
analysis demonstrates that such dismal outcomes are by no means pre-determined
and that sustainable self-governance institutional arrangements are possible.
10I am grateful to one of the referees for suggesting this point.
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.A. Equilibrium marginal price of non-cooperative group
composed of two myopic agents with dynamic demand
spill-over
The expected profit of producer i in period t is:
Eπi,t =
1
2
qiZ
0
[pt (qi)− c] dqi +
1
2
qiZ
0
[pt (qi + qj)− c] dqi.
As current demand can be broken down into a demand for current period con-
sumption and a discounted demand for future consumption, the demand function
in period t has a kink at pt = ab − δ. Let us denote demand level at the kink by qˆ:
∧
q = b (p¯t−1 + δ)− b
³a
b
− δ
´
= b
³
p¯t−1 −
a
b
+ 2δ
´
. (A.1)
At prices above the kink point, consumers demand the product only for immediate
consumption, while for the prices lower than the kink point, the products are con-
sumed by two types of consumers some of whom consume them immediately, and
others freeze them for future consumption. Producers, however, cannot diﬀeren-
tiate between the two types of consumers. From this it follows that the expected
profit function is represented by diﬀerent expressions, depending on whether the
equilibrium individual output level is greater or smaller than the kink point qˆ.We
consider the two cases separately: Case (i) when qi >
∧
q,
Eπi,t =
1
2
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∧
qZ
0
[pt (qi)− c] dqi +
qiZ
∧
q
[pt (qi)− c] dqi
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
+
1
2
qi+qjZ
qj
[pt (qi + qj)− c] dqi
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Case (ii) when qi ≤
∧
q,
Eπi,t =
1
2
qiZ
0
[pt (qi)− c] dqi+
1
2
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
∧
q−qjZ
0
[pt (qi + qj)− c] dqi +
qiZ
∧
q−qj
[pt (qi + qj)− c] dqi
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
The above expected profit functions can be rewritten explicitly as follows: (i)
when qi >
∧
q,
Eπi,t =
1
2
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∧
qZ
0
³
p¯t−1 + δ − c−
qi
b
´
dqi +
qiZ
∧
q
³ a
2b
+
p¯t−1
2
− c− qi
2b
´
dqi
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
+
1
2
qiZ
0
µ
a
2b
+
p¯t−1
2
− c− qi + qj
2b
¶
dqi.
(ii) when qi ≤
∧
q,
Eπi,t =
1
2
qiZ
0
³
p¯t−1 + δ − c−
qi
b
´
dqi
+
1
2
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
∧
q−qjZ
0
µ
p¯t−1 + δ − c−
qi + qj
b
¶
dqi +
qiZ
∧
q−qj
µ
a
2b
+
p¯t−1
2
− c− qi + qj
2b
¶
dqi
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
From the first-order conditions of the expected profit maximisation problem, we
obtain the following reaction functions:
(i) when qi > qˆ, then qi (qj) = a+ bp¯t−1 − 2bc−
qj
2
(ii) when qi ≤ qˆ, then qi (qj) =
a
3
+ bp¯t−1 −
4
3
bc+
2
3
bδ − qj
3
.
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Given the reaction functions above, the Nash equilibrium is symmetric and given
by:
(i) qMi =
2
3
(a+ bp¯t−1 − 2bc) , when
5a
b
− 4c > p¯t−1 + 6δ
(ii) qMi =
1
4
(a+ 3bp¯t−1 − 4bc+ 2bδ) , when
5a
b
− 4c ≤ p¯t−1 + 6δ.
From this, we obtain equilibrium marginal prices in period t:
(i) p¯Mt =
a+ bp¯t−1 −
¡
q¯Mi + q¯Mj
¢
2b
=
8bc− a− bp¯t−1
6b
(A.2)
(ii) p¯Mt =
a+ bp¯t−1 −
¡
qMi + qMj
¢
2b
=
4bc+ a− bp¯t−1 − 2bδ
4b
. (A.3)
With an infinite time horizon, the game beginning at date t looks the same for all
t, in the sense that the feasible strategies and the prospective payoﬀs are always
the same. As we are interested in studying the long − run steady-state, we find
a stationary equilibrium by requiring p¯t−1 = p¯t. Thus, when such an equilibrium
exists:
(i) p¯Nt = c−
a− bc
7b
, when
a
b
− c > 7
6
δ
(ii) p¯Nt = c+
a− bc− 2bδ
5b
,when
a
b
− c ≤ 7
6
δ.
Comparing the above results with (4.3), we observe that for ab − c >
3
4
δ,
q¯Mi < q¯Ni , and for
a
b − c ≤
3
4
δ, q¯Mi ≥ q¯Ni .
B. Equilibriummarginal price of non-cooperative group com-
posed of two non-myopic agents with dynamic demand
spill-over
Non-myopic agents will maximise the following expected profits.
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Case (i): when q¯i >
∧
q
Eπtt +Eπ
t+1
t +Eπ
t+1
t+1
=
1
2
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∧
qZ
0
³
p¯t−1 + δ − c−
qi
b
´
dqi +
qiZ
∧
q
³ a
2b
+
p¯t−1
2
− c− qi
2b
´
dqi +
qiZ
0
³
p¯t + δ − c−
qi
b
´
dqi
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
+
1
2
⎧
⎨
⎩
qiZ
0
µ
a
2b
+
p¯t−1
2
− c− qi + q¯j
2b
¶
dqi +
qiZ
0
µ
p¯t + δ − c−
qi + q¯j
b
¶
dqi
⎫
⎬
⎭ .
Case (ii): when q¯i ≤
∧
q
Eπtt +Eπ
t+1
t +Eπ
t+1
t+1
=
1
2
⎧
⎨
⎩
qiZ
0
³
p¯t−1 + δ − c−
qi
b
´
dqi +
qiZ
0
³
p¯t + δ − c−
qi
b
´
dqi
⎫
⎬
⎭
+
1
2
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
∧
q−qjR
0
¡
p¯t−1 + δ − c− qi+qjb
¢
dqi +
qiR
∧
q−qj
¡
a
2b +
p¯t−1
2
− c− qi+q¯j
2b
¢
dqi
+
qiR
0
¡
p¯t + δ − c− qi+q¯jb
¢
dqi
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
.
From the first-order conditions of the expected profit maximisation problem, we
obtain the following reaction functions:
(i) when qi > qˆ, then qi (qj) =
3a+ 3bp¯t−1 + 4bp¯t − 10bc+ 4bδ − 3q¯j
6
(ii) when qi ≤ qˆ, then qi (qj) =
2a+ 4bp¯t−1 + 4bp¯t − 10bc+ 6bδ − 4q¯j
7
Given the reaction functions above, the Nash equilibrium is symmetric and given
by:
(i) q¯NMi =
3a+ 3bp¯t−1 + 4bp¯t − 10bc+ 4bδ
9
, when
a
b
− 5
6
c >
p¯t−1
2
− p¯t
4
+
7
6
δ
(ii) q¯NMi =
2a+ 4bp¯t−1 + 4bp¯t − 10bc+ 6bδ
11
, when
a
b
− 5
6
c ≤ p¯t−1
2
− p¯t
4
+
7
6
δ.
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By letting p¯t = p¯t+1 we find a long-run stationary equilibrium marginal prices:
(i) p¯NMt = c+
3a− 21bc− 8bδ
23b
, when
a
b
− 117c
135
>
7
6
δ +
δ
30
(B.1)
(ii) p¯NMt = c+
7a− 29bc− 12bδ
5b
, when
a
b
− 117c
135
≤ 7
6
δ +
δ
30
(B.2)
The comparison of equilibrium marginal prices implies the following results.
When ab −
117c
135
> 7
6
δ + δ
30
(from (4.7) and (B.1)),
p¯NMt − p¯Nt =
44a− 170bc− 56bδ
23× 7b .
When ab −
117c
135
≤ 7
6
δ + δ
30
and ab − c >
7
6
δ (from (4.7) and (B.2)),
p¯NMt − p¯Nt =
76a− 23bc− 84bδ
27× 7b
When ab − c ≤
7
6
δ,from (4.8) and (B.2),
p¯NMt − p¯Nt =
5(6a− 6bc− 7bδ)− 110bc− 15bδ
135b
< 0.
From the above,
p¯NMt ≥ p¯Nt , if
a
b
− c ≤ 84δ + 53c
76
.
C. Marginal prices when Groups A and B produce alter-
natingly
Taking the first-order conditions of Group A’s profit maximising problem (5.6),
we have:
∂πtt
∂p¯t
+
∂πt+1t
∂p¯t
+
∂πt+2t+2
∂p¯t+1
∂p¯t+1
∂p¯t
= 0
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For case (i)
⇔ 2b (cA − p¯t) + b (p¯t+1 + δ − cA)
µ
−1
6
¶
= 0
⇔ p¯t (p¯t+1) =
13cA − δ − p¯t+1
12
. (C.1)
For case (ii)
⇔ 2b (cA − p¯t) + b (p¯t+1 + δ − cA)
µ
−1
4
¶
= 0
⇔ p¯t (p¯t+1) =
9cA − δ − p¯t+1
8
. (C.2)
As for Group B, reaction functions take the same forms as (A.2) and (A.3). Thus:
For case (i)
p¯t+1 (p¯t) =
8bcB − a− bp¯t
6b
. (C.3)
For case (ii)
p¯t+1 (p¯t) =
4bcB + a− bp¯t − 2bδ
4b
. (C.4)
Solving (C.1) and (C.3): Case (i) when 59a− 13bcA − 46bcB − 70bδ > 0,
p¯t =
a+ 78bcA − 8bcB − 6bδ
71b
(C.5)
p¯t+1 =
−12a− 13bcA + 96bcB + bδ
71b
.
Similarly, from (C.2) and (C.4): Case (ii) when 39a− 9bcA − 30bcB − 46bδ ≤ 0,
p¯t =
−a+ 36bcA − 4bcB − 2bδ
31b
(C.6)
p¯t+1 =
8a− 9bcA + 32bcB − 15bδ
31b
.
Let us assume that Group A members have access to a lower cost technology than
Group B members do, say by virtue of cooperativeness among group members,
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i.e. cA ≤ cB. By assuming one-period spill over (3.3), we obtain the following
inequalities:
1
3
³a
b
− cA
´
< δ <
1
2
³a
b
− cA
´
, and
1
3
³a
b
− cB
´
< δ.
Using these inequalities, we evaluate the equilibrium marginal prices for each case.
Case (i) when 59a− 13bcA − 46bcB − 70bδ > 0,
p¯t = cA +
7b (cA − cB) + (a− bcB − 6bδ)
71b
< cA
p¯t+1 = cB + δ +
(59a− 13bcA − 46bcB − 70bδ)− 71 (a− bcB)
71b
< cB + δ
Case (ii) when 39a− 9bcA − 30bcB − 46bδ ≤ 0,
p¯t = cA +
5b (cA − cB)− (a− bcB + 2bδ)
31b
< cA
p¯t+1˜ =
8a− 9bcA + 32bcB − 15bδ
31b
= cB+
8 (a− bcA − 2bδ) + b (cB − cA) + bδ
31b
> cB
also p¯t+1 = cB + δ +
(39a− 9bcA − 30bcB − 46bδ)− 31 (a− bcB)
31b
< cB + δ,
Summarising the above, we obtain the results in Table 5.2.
D. Derivation of the marginal prices
Parameters of intertemporal reaction functions can be obtained by rearranging
them and solving for p¯t. For instance, using (6.3) and (6.4), the reaction function
of Group A in the second season can be written as:
p¯t = p∗A +RA (p¯t+1 − p∗B) .
Similarly, Group B’s reaction function becomes:
p¯t+1 = p∗B +RB (p¯t − p∗A) + fRB (p¯t+2 − p∗A) .
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Using p¯t = p¯t+2 = pA, and p¯t−1 = p¯t+1 = pB at the stationary equilibria in solving
the above reaction functions, we obtain:
pA =
αA +RAαB
1−RA
³
RB − fRB´ , pA =
αB + αA
³
RB + fRB´
1−RA
³
RB − fRB´
where αA = pA +RApB and αB = pB −RBpB + fRBpA.
Replacing coeﬃcients with the parameters with the marginal price-determination
equation (6.1) yields Table 6.1
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E. Alternative estimations of the marginal price determi-
nation equations
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
α : Constant 432.16**
(151.04)
521.23**
(157.78)
392.94**
(112.77)
521.23** 
(157.91) 
β1 : 1** +tpSeasonGroup  0.2339*
(0.1031)
0.2168φ
(0.1103)
0.2334*
(0.1052)
0.2168* 
(0.1104) 
β2: 1*)1( +− tpGroup  0.2822 
(0.2488)
0.2459 
(0.2666) 
γ1 : ( 11 )* tSeason p +−  0.6674**(0.1163) 0.5842
**
(0.1206)
0.6807**
(0.0872)
0.5842** 
(0.1207) 
γ2: 1*)1( −− tpGroup  0.5472*
(0.2317)
0.7009**
(0.2184)
0.4737**
(0.1406)
0.5926φ 
(0.2481) 
D1: Season -330.68
(251.26)
-263.79
(238.48)
-373.4 
(226.60) 
D2: Group*Season 502.99*
(220.71)
367.12φ
(204.36)
212.14 
(146.91)
476.70* 
(236.52) 
D3: Saturday 108.04 
(87.167)
 
D4: Saturday*Season 71.723 
(102.15)
174.34**
(54.25)
 
2R  0.7510 0.6958 0.7240 0.6953 
White test for 
homoskedasticity 
0.2987 0.3609 0.4228 0.3411 
Skewness/Kurtosis test for 
normality 
0.5097 0.2080 0.0798 0.1607 
Durbin-Watson 
d-statistic 
1.6350 
(dL=1.489, 
dU=1.852) 
1.5684 
(dL=1.557, 
dU=1.778) 
1.5326 
(dL=1.557, 
dU=1.903) 
1.6314 
(dL=1.535, 
dU=1.802) 
Notes: In each model, the dependent variable is the lowest price of each fishing day.  Standard 
deviations are shown in brackets. **, *, and φ denote significance at 99%, 95%, and 90% levels of 
confidence, respectively. 94 observations of lowest prices of Shiroebi sold between 1st April 1997 and 
30 August 1997 are used for the estimation.  
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